John Riley, Sr. - The Battle of New Hope Church

The Battle of New Hope Church

The Battle of New Hope Church - Characteristics of the Defense Employed by Major General Stewart's Division

By CPT Joshua A. Carson, Infantry

07 SEP 2012

On 25 May 1864, Element's of Major General Sherman's Union Military Division of the Mississippi engaged General Johnston's Confederate Army of the Tennessee at the battle of New Hope Church. During this battle, Major General Stewart's Division of General Hood's Corps successfully defended against Brigadier General Hooker's XX Corps. Through effective use of preparation, disruption and massing effects, Major General Stewart's Division successfully defended New Hope Church by using techniques delineated in the Characteristics of the Defense.

The Battle of New Hope Church was a part of the Atlanta Campaign with Strategic and Operational importance to both sides of the battle. Following the Confederate defeat in Tennessee during the Chattanooga Campaign in the autumn of 1863, The Confederate Army of Tennessee retreated to Dalton, GA. The Confederate commander General Bragg was replaced with General Joe Johnston. The Union Commander, General Grant, was promoted and took command of the eastern theater of the war and was replaced in Tennessee by Major General Sherman. Major General Sherman's goal for the 1964 Atlanta campaign was the seizure of Atlanta. The Confederate States of America's (CSA) President Jefferson Davis ordered General Johnston to defend Georgia, specifically Atlanta. Davis believed that by retaining Atlanta through the US presidential elections in November 1864, there was a good possibility that the US public would tire of the war and elect a more moderate government who would sue for peace with the CSA. On the contrary, losing Atlanta would provide President Lincoln's administration with a high-profile victory that would likely support his reelection and a continuation of the war that would likely lead to the CSA's overall defeat. The battle of New Hope Church was a step in the Union's attempt to seize Atlanta, and a step in the Confederate's opposing goal of defending Atlanta from capture.

From May 7th to May 17th, Major General Sherman successfully drove his forces southward from Chattanooga towards Atlanta following the path of the Western & Atlantic Rail line. He successfully used turning movements to displace General Johnston's forces from defensive positions at Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, and Adairsville. On May 19th, Johnston established a highly favorable defensive position at the Allatoona Pass where terrain created an existing obstacle that could not be easily bypassed by a short turning movement. Major General Sherman chose to make a much wider bypass to the west of the railroad and Allatoona Pass in hopes of seizing Dallas to Johnston's rear, and again turn Johnston's forces out of their defensive positions. Once the Confederate forces were forced to withdraw, Sherman could link up with the rail line at Marietta and continue south towards Atlanta. However, elements of Johnston's cavalry reported large portions of Sherman's forces moving to the west, and on May 23rd Johnston ordered Lieutenant General Polk and Lieutenant General Hardee's Corps towards Dallas to defend against Sherman's suspected turning movement, and Lieutenant General Hood's Corps to tie-in on the right flank the following day (Castel, 219). The Battle of New Hope Church served the operational purpose of preventing the Union forces from seizing Dallas in order to prevent the Union forces from bypassing the Confederate defense north of Atlanta.

The weather and terrain had a significant impact on the outcome of the Battle of New Hope Church. The weather on May 25th was humid, overcast, and threatening to thunderstorm throughout the day, with a severe thunderstorm occurring in the evening (Scaife, 48). This heat and humidity limited the maneuverability of units during the battle. The terrain was severely restrictive due to uneven, densely woodland terrain and insufficient roads to accommodate corps or larger sized movements (Blount 43-44). This challenging terrain had the effect of limiting maneuverability, reducing the size and number of avenues of approach, and drastically reducing the fields of fire to extremely close-range.

On an operational level, the primary corps involved in the Battle of New Hope Church from Sherman's Military Division of the Mississippi was Major General Hooker's XX Army Corps from Major General Thomas's Army of the Cumberland. The primary corps involved from Johnston's Army of Tennessee was Lieutenant General Hood's Corps. From Hooker's XX Corps, the primary Divisions involved were Brigadier General Geary's Second Division and Brigadier General William's First Division. For the Confederates, Major General Stewart's Division defended against the Union's main effort on 25 May. At the operational level, Sherman's total forces constituted about a 2:1 ratio to Johnston's Army of Tennessee at the onset of the campaign (McMurry, 236). At the tactical level, all of Hooker's Corps estimated approximately 16,000, whereas Stewart's division (not including the reserve) totaled 4,000 (Castel 225).

Due to Sherman's detour from the Western & Atlantic Rail line through rough terrain, the Union forces relied on wagon trains for sustainment (Canaan, 61). Due to the rough terrain, they were not able to rapidly deploy their artillery through the wooded terrain, forcing Hooker's Corps to assault without artillery support (Canaan 65). Stewart incorporated Major Eldridge's artillery battalion into his defensive line. Eldridge's battalion consisted of four Napoleon cannons, four 12 inch howitzers, and four 3 inch ordinance rifles (Scaife 48).

Johnston's cavalry elements provided reconnaissance that gave Stewart an intelligence advantage leading into the Battle of New Hope Church. Johnston received reports on 23 May that indicated Sherman's forces were attempting a turning movement to the west that was headed for Dallas. On the 25th of May at approximately 10:00 AM, when Geary's division intercepted elements of Colonel Jones' 9th Texas Cavalry attempting to burn a bridge at Owen's Mill crossing Pumpkin Vine Creek, Johnston discovered XX Corps' whereabouts. On the contrary, Sherman did not receive reports that Hood's entire Corps was defending New Hope Church until Geary's division captured prisoners from Stewart's skirmisher element, and in spite of those reports Sherman believed that the main body of Johnston's Army of Tennessee was at Marietta (Castel 220-221).

Hooker's mission for 25 May was to seize Dallas. Geary's division was the lead element in the order of march. After crossing Pumpkin Vine Creek and reaching a fork in the road, Hooker could not determine which road led to Dallas. Hooker ordered Geary's division to take a road that actually led to New Hope Church with Hooker's HQ element, while Hooker ordered his other two divisions to take an alternate road, believing both routes led to Dallas (Blount 43-44).

Hood's mission was to defend the right flank of Polk's Corps arrayed at Dallas, in the vicinity of New Hope Church (Castel 221). Stewart's division was tasked with defending the center of Hood's line between Hindman and Stevensen's Divisions. Stewart received the additional task from Hood of sending one regiment in advance of the defensive line to act as the skirmisher force for Hood's Corps (Scaife 48).

On the morning of May 25th, Hood's Corps arrived to New Hope Church at around 10:00 AM (Dean 16). Stewart's Division was arrayed in the center of Hood's Corps, with Hindman and Stevenson's Divisions on his left and right (Scaife, 48). Stewart arrayed his regiments with Brigadier General Stovall's Georgia Brigade to the left, Brigadier General Clayton's Alabama Brigade in the center, Brigadier General Baker's Alabama Brigade to the right, and Brigadier General Gibson's Louisiana Brigade in reserve (Scaife 57). Stewart's division immediately began erecting hasty defensive positions out of logs covered in earth (Castel 221) while Clayton's Brigade sent Colonel Jones' 32/58th Alabama Regiment with the 14th Louisiana Sharpshooters Battalion from Gibson's Brigade attached ahead of the defensive line as a reconnaissance and skirmisher force (Blount 45).

About 1.5 miles in front of Stewart's defensive line (about 1.5 miles down the road from Owen's Mill), Jones' regiment encountered the lead brigade of Geary's division under Colonel Candy. Jones requested guidance from Stewart, and was ordered to hold position and develop the situation (Dean 18). Instead, Jones assaulted Candy's brigade, and Geary brought 2 additional brigades on line and nearly enveloped Jones' battalion. Jones retreated back to Stewart's line and became the division reserve. Jones recounted the incident as follows:

…I received orders to advance westwardly along a road… General Hood wished me to advance along that road and drive the enemy back… the skirmishers of the enemy made a stubborn resistance… General Hood [ordered] the officers in front to press vigorously forward, make the enemy develop their strength, and then hold the position…I was satisfied that the force advancing on me was largely disproportionate to my own, and that I could make but a feeble resistance… I ordered the regiment to charge the advancing line of enemy… One regiment of the enemy that overlapped my right pressed forward, enfilading my right, as did also the line of battle extending several hundred yards beyond my left. I ordered a retreat barely in time to escape the capture of the entire regiment. (Jones, quoted in Luvaas 183)

Geary learned from captured members of Jones' element that Hood's entire corps was in front of him. Geary realized his division was isolated with the other 2 divisions of Hooker's XX Corps traveling along a different route over 5 miles away, and he was at risk of being overwhelmed if Hood's Corps counterattacked. Geary consulted Hooker and Thomas about his isolation and decided to take up a defensive position in case of a counterattack. At about 2:00 PM, Geary halted his division, dug defensive positions, and waited for reinforcements (Dean 19). Geary described the skirmish attack this way:

Our skirmishers became heavily engaged with those of the enemy, and almost immediately a furious charge was made upon us… From prisoners captured we learned that Hood's entire corps was in our front, and Hardee's not far off… My division was isolated, at least five miles from the nearest supporting troops… My command was… halted and formed on a ridge in the woods, advantageous for defense… (Geary, quoted in Luvaas 182)

Thomas requested via courier that Howard's IV Corps hastily reinforce Hooker's XX Corps. Along the way, the courier encountered Sherman and notified him of the developments with XX Corps. Sherman relayed orders to William's division to assault as soon as it linked up with Geary's division, stating,

Let Williams go in anywhere as soon as he gets up. I don't see what they are waiting for in front now. There haven't been twenty rebels there today (Sherman, quoted in Castel, 223).

XX Corps consolidated at Geary's position sometime around 4:00 PM. Williams' division became the lead element, Butterfield slightly trailing to the left, and Geary following Williams (Castel 223). The Divisions formed in column of brigades (Scaife 48), meaning that the front of Hooker's Corps that didn't have their fires masked by friendly units was 2 brigades wide, whereas Stewart's division had 3 brigades on line including a battalion of artillery. At about 5:00 PM, Hooker's Corps initiated the assault, directed towards Hood's center held by Stewart's division. As Hooker's Corps entered Stewart's engagement area, Stewart's divisions fired upon Hooker's divisions with intersecting fields of artillery fire before they could even visually identify Stewart's defensive positions due to the dense vegetation. Williams describes his division's assault on Stewart's position:

They were in dense woods with considerable underbrush and the ground full of small ravines enclosed in Generaltly swelling hills, which evidently grew higher in front and was the entrenched line of the enemy. We could see but a few rods in front… I was ordered to the front with my division and told that I was to push forward and drive the enemy until I found out his force or chased him away from our front… As the opposition became intensified, I sounded the “double-quick” and all three lines pounded forward on the trot… soon we got within range of the enemy's artillery and they poured into us canister and shrapnel from all directions except the rear… my whole division had nearly expended its ammunition. (Williams, quoted in Luvaas, 186).

Geary, whose division followed and relieved Williams' division, described the engagement as follows:

Each division was quickly formed for attacks in columns by brigades… and the corps advanced upon the enemy… I received orders to push forward and relieve [Williams'] troops… between 6 and 7 p.m. The movement… was made with great rapidity, through a dense woods, swept by a very heavy artillery and musketry fire. The discharges of canister and shell from the enemy were heavier than in any other battle of the campaign in which my command were engaged… my command was halted close under the enemy's batteries and entrenchments… The night was intensely dark, and a very severe thunder-storm, with cold, pelting rain, added to the gloom… Breast-works were thrown up as fast as possible during the night… (Geary, quoted in Luvaas, 185).

Hooker's corps pushed to within 25 meters of Stewart's defenses in some locations, yet failed to penetrate the Confederate defense. Upon nightfall, Hooker's forces dug into their own defensive positions and no further ground was gained in vicinity of New Hope Church. Stewart's division successfully prevented the Union forces from achieving their objective of seizing Dallas. Hooker reported 1665 casualties for the day, and Confederate casualties are estimated to have been around 450 (Dean, 29). For the following 5 days, each army extended their lines southwest and northeast in attempts to outflank the other, resulting in the Battles of Pickett Mills and Dallas, collectively known as the “Hell-Hole in Georgia”

Stewart's successful defense against a corps-sized enemy's main effort can largely be attributed to his implementing sound tactical decisions that match current Army doctrine. Current doctrine states that the characteristics of the defense are preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility. Stewart's defense displayed good examples of preparation, disruption, and massing effects.

Stewart's division used the limited time they had during the morning of May 25th to prepare their defense by building survivability positions, clearing fields of fire, and developing an engagement area. Hood's corps arrived at New Hope Church at approximately 9:00 AM, and Stewart's division immediately set to work preparing the defense. Lieutenant Colonel Green, a regiment commander in Baker's brigade, stated, “The men threw up hasty works of old logs and fence rails.” According to Stewart, “Baker and Clayton's men had piled up a few logs; Stovall's Georgians were without any defense (Stewart, quoted in Luvaas, 191).” While Stewart said that Stovall's brigade did not build defensive positions, the reason for this may have been that their portion of the defensive line ran through the New Hope Church cemetery, and rather than dig within the cemetery they used the tombstones for cover (Castel 221). With Hooker's forces delayed by a decision to consolidate his divisions before launching the assault, Stewart's forces continued to use the majority of the day to dig trenches, improve the log and earth fortifications, and clear fields of fire in front of their line (Canaan 64). In addition to preparing survivability positions, Stewart also developed his engagement area by incorporating the existing obstacles provided by the rough terrain and thick brush into his defensive plan. He also incorporated his artillery fire along with his small arms fire to cover the existing obstacles. Stewart's forces fulfilled the preparation characteristic of the defense by making hasty preparations of their fighting positions and developing the engagement area. Days later during the Battle of Picket's Mill, Union soldiers engaged in an assault on an unfortified portion of the Confederate defenses said, “Ah! Damn you, we have caught you without your logs now! (Cleburne, quoted in Luvaas, 211)” This sentiment implies that the Union troops considered the prepared fortifications at New Hope Church as a significant factor that contributed to Stewart's successful defense on May 25th.

Stewart's defense exhibited disruption as a characteristic of the defense by using existing obstacles and a skirmish force to break up the enemy's formation and slow his tempo. Because of the difficult terrain and the challenges to maintaining control of large elements in the woods, Hooker's forces choose to advance in a column of brigades formation. The column of brigades formation made it easier to maintain control of the divisions and keep individual brigades from getting lost (Dean 24). However, this also meant that the lead brigade in each division masked the fire of the brigades behind them and they could not mass their fires on the enemy. This meant only the lead brigade in the 2 columns of Hooker's corps could return fire on Stewart's fortifications. In contrast, Stewart had 3 divisions on line that had the capability to fire into the sides of Hooker's formation, mitigating the numerical superiority that Hooker's corps had over Stewart's division. In addition, while Stewart's skirmish element under Colonel Jones failed to fix the enemy they eventually retreated, the assault still successfully caused the enemy to halt for over 2 hours to wait for reinforcements to arrive. The skirmisher action still achieved the effect of disrupting the enemy's tempo and effectively applied a characteristic of the defense.

Stewart's defense at New Hope Church was an excellent example of massing effects. Through incorporating Eldridges' artillery battalion within the line of infantry, Stewart was able to mass the effects of his small arms and artillery at the engagement area in front of Clayton's position. According to Geary, “the discharges of canister and shell from the enemy were heavier than in any other battle of the campaign (Geary quoted in Luvaas, 184).” Colonel Cobham, one of Geary's brigade commanders, stated “The terrible discharges of grape and canister from the battery, which literally swept our men away, added to the severe fire from the enemy's infantry (Cobham quoted in Luvaas, 188).” Stewart said of the artillery, “Eldrige's battalion of artillery… was admirably posted, well served, and did great execution (Stewart, quoted in Lavaas, 191).” Hood stated of the artillery incorporated in Stewart's line,

“Thus Hooker's entire corps was driven back by three brigades of Stewart's division… too much praise cannot be awarded to the artillery… which did great execution in the enemy's ranks, and added much to their discomfiture (Hood, quoted in Lavaas, 190).”

By massing his artillery and small arms on the enemy within his engagement area, Stewart used the characteristic of the defense of massing effects to successfully defend New Hope Church.

Stewart successfully defended his sector from an enemy that had a 4:1 numerical advantage over his own forces by making sound tactical decisions that align with our modern understanding of the characteristics of the defense. He prepared for the attack by developing his engagement area and building fighting positions, disrupted the enemy's tempo and formation so that the enemy arrived late and could not mass his combat power, and massed his own effects to maximize his destruction of the enemy. While the individual weapon systems and unit movements and formations have changed, the overall characteristics of the defense applied to 1864 as well as they apply to today's armed conflicts.

Bailey, Ronald. Battles for Atlanta; Sherman Moves East. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985. Print.

Blount, Russell Jr. The Battles of New Hope Church. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Co., 2010. Print.

Cannan, John. The Atlanta Campaign. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, Inc., 1991. Print.

Castel, Albert. Decision in the West; the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Print.

Dean, Jeffrey. The Hell-Hole in Georgia; Sherman vs. Johnston May 22-June 2, 1864. Westminster, MD: Heritage Books, Inc., 2006. Print.

Luvaas, Jay and Harold Nelson. Guide to the Atlanta Campaign: Rocky Face Ridge to Kennesaw Mountain. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008. Print.

McMurry, Richard. “Johnston's Atlanta Campaign.” The Campaign for Atlanta & Sherman's March to the Sea Volume II. Ed. Theodore Savas and David Woodbury. Campbell, CA: Savas Woodbury Publishers, 1994. Print.

Scaife, William. The Campaign for Atlanta. 4th ed. Cartersville, GA: Scaife Publications, 1993. Print.

CPT Joshua A. Carson, graduate of USMA West Point class of 2007 is a direct descendent of Emanuel Riley, KIA at New Hope Church.